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Digital Attribution:
Copyright and the Right to Credit
Greg Lastowka*
If [a publisher] does not sell copies at a profit, he will soon be an
ex-publisher. The author, however, may be interested in the widest
possible dissemination of his writings, and if someone were willing
to reprint 10,000 copies of his articles for free distribution, that
would provide a great additional profit to the author in terms of
professional credit.
-- Ralph R. Shaw1

Introduction: Ralph Shaw
The above quote is taken from a May 1951 article in the magazine Science
entitled “Copyright and the Right to Credit.”2 In the article, Ralph Shaw argued that
copyright law paid insufficient attention to the attribution interests of authors. Shaw
observed that the straightforward pecuniary interests of publishers diverged from the
more complex reputation-based interests of authors. He noted how authors and
publishers might have differing views regarding the benefits of providing thousands
of copies of a work for “free distribution.” Of course, since he had just pointed out
that no sensible publisher would be interested in giving away free works, the example
he used to demonstrate these divergent motivations was fanciful.
Ralph Shaw was a librarian, not a lawyer. 3 He was interested in information
science, of course, but he also pursued various other projects. One of those projects

Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. Thanks go to Edward
Castronova, Dan Hunter, Marc Perlman, Unggi Yoon, Graeme Dinwoodie, and participants in the
2006 Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium for comments and helpful contributions, and to
Candidus Dougherty for excellent research assistance.
1 Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 572 (1951).
2 Id. Shaw’s article about credit was an excerpt from his book, which was published the small
press that he founded. See RALPH SHAW, LITERARY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (Scarecrow
Press 1950).
3 Shaw had a prominent career as a librarian. He served as the Dean of the Library and
Information Sciences Department at Rutgers University and as the chief librarian at the United States
*
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was advancing the technologies of information storage and retrieval. Notably, Shaw
was instrumental in funding one prototype version of Vannevar Bush’s “Memex”
machine, often referenced today as the conceptual predecessor of the World Wide
Web.4 The “Rapid Selector” that Shaw and Bush developed together was a mix of
circuitry and microfilm that was about the size of a car. It reportedly scanned 10,000
frames of text each minute in search of bits of information.5 The unveiling of this
“electronic marvel” was reportedly attended with substantial publicity.6
But both of Shaw’s projects described here—his attempt to get copyright to
incorporate a right to credit and his attempt to revolutionize information
dissemination and retrieval practices with new technology—did not pan out very well.
The logic of copyright law continued to be guided by the interests of publishers, not
authors. And the Rapid Selector project was largely a failure due to technical
problems.7 As it turned out, the future of access to information lay not with
microfilm, but with a candidate that must have seemed highly unlikely in 1951: the
behemoth calculator ENIAC, a $500,000 monstrosity that had the primary task of
working on firing tables for U.S. artillery shells. ENIAC was obviously not part of a
network and its information storage capacity was limited to a miniscule (by today’s
standards) 16K of memory.8

Department of Agriculture. Dean Eugene Garfield, To Remember Ralph Shaw, 23 CURRENT CONENTS
5-11 (June 5, 1978), available online at
<http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/essays/v3p504y1977-78.pdf>.
4 See Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1945, at 101.
5 Some of those who have studied the history of the Memex are a bit critical of the popular
credit given to Bush for both its conception and implementation. Michael K. Buckland, Emanuel
Goldberg, electronic document retrieval, and Vannevar Bush’s Memex, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 284 (1992)
(suggesting Bush’s contemporaries were more inventive and had more imaginative understandings of
the potentials of information technology); Colin Burke, The other Memex: The tangled career of Vannevar
Bush’s Information Machine, The Rapid Selector, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 648 (1992) (suggesting that
Bush’s work on practical versions of the Memex was a history of avoidable design failures).
6 Dean Eugene Garfield, To Remember Ralph Shaw, 23 CURRENT CONENTS 5-11 (June 5, 1978),
available online at <http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/essays/v3p504y1977-78.pdf>.
7 Colin Burke, The other Memex: The tangled career of Vannevar Bush’s Information Machine, The Rapid
Selector, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 648 (1992).
8 Those excited about digital computers did see their potential as information retrieval devices.
Like all visionaries, though, they were slightly off:
You will be able to dial into the catalogue machine ‘making biscuit.’ There will
be a flutter of movie film in the machine. Soon it will stop, and, in front of you
on the screen will be projected the part of the catalogue which shows the names
of three or four books containing recipes for biscuits.
EDMUND C. BERKELEY, GIANT BRAINS: OR MACHINES THAT THINK 181 (1949) (quoted in
Michael K. Buckland, Emanuel Goldberg, electronic document retrieval, and Vannevar Bush’s Memex, 43 J. AM.
SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 284, 286 (1992)). Edmund Berkeley, who wrote this, was the founder of the
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However, the Memex that Shaw and Bush sought to create turned out to be
ENIAC’s descendant: the World Wide Web delivers a hyperlinked high-speed
information environment that Shaw and Bush could not have imagined. Most
importantly for the purposes of this paper, with the advent of the World Wide Web,
just as Shaw predicted, authors are now giving away thousands—even millions—of
free “reprints” and realizing “a great additional profit… in terms of professional
credit.”9
However, copyright law has largely ignored this fact. Shaw’s “right to credit”
is still as much a fantasy as the World Wide Web was half a century ago. This article
takes up Ralph Shaw’s call for a right to credit in a new era of networked information
systems. Copyright law should be adjusted to take into account the growing
importance of open access forms of copyright creation—a term I’ll shorten here to
“open copyright”10—and reputation economies. Prioritizing the legal importance of
attribution in copyright is a change that is long overdue. The contemporary digital
environment provides an opportunity and an important additional reason to revisit
Shaw’s salient distinction between the motivations of authors and publisher.
This article proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I describe the ways
in which copyright has so far responded to the “digital dilemma.” I point out that the
dilemma is often overplayed in Washington and conceived of in the wrong terms.
Despite the fact that open copyright has played a key part in the social utility of the
World Wide Web, the law has largely ignored its impact, focusing instead on the
perspective of publishers. I explain why the phenomenon of open copyright is not
primarily an ideological agenda, but a market transformation. Attribution and social
reputation markets are essential to many who create in this environment.
In the second part, I look at how intellectual property law addresses authorial
attribution interests. I begin with an extended discussion of advertising and law,
drawing parallels between open copyright and advertising. I then move on to
copyright and trademark law, noting that protections for authorial attribution are as
sorely lacking today as they were in Shaw’s day. I conclude by noting how, despite
the formal deficit in statutory intellectual property law, there are hopeful signs that a
new interest in authorial attribution is emerging.
Association of Computing Machinery and has also been described sometimes as the creator of the
first “personal computer,” Simon. Peter J. Denning, Edmund C. Berkeley—ACM founder, 31 COMM.
OF THE ACM 781-82 (June 1988).
9 Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 572 (1951).
10 For a description of what “open access” means, see Peter Suber’s overview of the term:
<http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm>. I use the term “open copyright” to
emphasize that the material at issue here is formally subject to copyright control and not material that
is in the public domain.
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Finally, in a third part, I suggest one concrete proposal for adapting copyright
to better fit online reputation economies. I propose formally including attribution as
a fifth factor in the statutory fair use analysis under 17 U.S.C. §107. There are a
handful of cases that consider attribution and fair use, but I argue that attribution
deserves specific mention in the statutory language regarding fair use.

I.

Copyright & Digital Networks

A. The Digital Dilemma & Legal Responses
During the last decade the costs of information capture, replication,
manipulation, and distribution have been reduced dramatically by widespread digital
tools and networks. Yet in copyright policy circles, this change has (perhaps
strangely) been framed not as a social boon, but as a “digital dilemma” facing the law
of copyright.11 The perceived problem is that with more powerful and less expensive
technologies, the public has greater power to infringe copyrights by reproducing and
disseminating works. Even highly dense and complex audiovisual information
objects such as Hollywood films are now being subject to unauthorized transmission
and replication through digital networks. Many of those in the copyright industries
regularly express dismay at the extent to which their enforcement efforts are failing to
prevent rampant digital piracy. Reports of copyright piracy can be found practically
every day in the news media.12
Copyright holders have attempted to respond to the “digital dilemma” in
several ways. First, they have lobbied for and obtained stronger copyright laws.
These laws are intended to send stronger deterrent signals to potential infringers.
Criminal penalties for copyright infringement have been increased. The No
Electronic Theft Act is one prominent example.13 A second response has been the
employment of extra-legal technologies and contractually-based practices to achieve
copyright-related outcomes that cannot be achieved through the law of copyright.14

See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, COMPUTER SCIENCE &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (National Academy of Sciences Press 2000).
12 To get a contemporary snapshot of the latest new articles on piracy, see
<http://news.google.com/nwshp?hl=en&tab=wn&q=piracy>.
13 See generally Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright
Infringement, 82 OREGON L. REV. 369 (2003).
14 As Jessica Litman has noted, attempts to achieve functional as well as legal control over
reproduction are nothing new. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L.
REV. 19, 34 (1996).
11
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The popular use of “digital rights management” (“DRM”) today often constitutes an
attempt to achieve practical results through technology that effectively mirror or
extend the proprietary rights envisioned by copyright law.15
Additionally, new laws have been created to respond directly to the digital
environment.16 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) is probably the
most well-known example a law that creates a new breed of para-copyright
entitlements.17 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA effectively combine
with the DRM controls described above to create a “technolegical” system of
copyright.18 Rather than protecting works, in other words, the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions protect the integrity of the digital protections that enclose
and encode works.19 Many legal scholars and public interest groups have criticized
these technolegical protections as operating in ways that are contrary to the public
interest.20
During the last two decades, the success of digital copyright reforms has been
debatable. The new technolegical wave of copyright has generally been popular and
resilient in legislatures and courtrooms.21 Yet news stories suggest no abatement in
digital piracy—things are said to be getting constantly worse for the copyright
industries. Academic commentary, on the other hand, has become increasingly

See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538, 548, 557 (2005).
16 See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 548, 557 (2005); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 174-78 (1998); Pamela Samuelson,
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
17 See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.; Medical Broadcasting Co. v. Flaiz,
Civ. No. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003) (“[C]laims under the DMCA,
however, are simply not copyright infringement claims and are separate and distinct from the
latter.”); 3 M. & D. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12A.18[B] (2003).
18 See James Gibson, Re-Reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 167-70 (2004).
19 These provisions of the DMCA have been widely criticized. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Law
Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 7 (2003); Timothy B. Lee, Circumventing
Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, CATO Policy Analysis No.
564 (Mar. 21, 2006), available online at: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6025.
20 See, e.g, LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS 187-190 (2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 151-165 (2001); Jessica Litman, War
Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002).
21 Universal City Studios v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
15
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critical of expansions in the strength of copyright law and has pointed out how the
public interest in copyright law has been largely ignored by lawmakers.22

B. The Growth of Open Copyright
The “digital dilemma” story—a story of piracy and legal response—takes the
forefront in media stories about copyright today. A lesser appearance is sometimes
made by stories that criticize the overextension of intellectual property laws. Yet
perhaps the most important story to be told about digital networks and copyright
goes untold because it is so commonplace and is perceived as generally good news.
The last ten years has brought society an incredible wealth of access to copyrightprotected content that is made freely available online, with the permission of
copyright holders.23
The creators of much of the popular content on the Wide Wide Web do not
seek payment in return for access to their work. Much of the essential content on the
World Wide Web is “posted” so that it is freely accessible to anyone with an Internet
connection. Creating such a universally accessible sea of interlinked information had
long been a dream of technologists,24 and the drive to share useful information
resources with distance locales through electronic networks was one of the primary
reasons for the original creation of the Internet.25
The realm of “open access”26 materials made publicly available on the Web is
essentially a realm of “open copyright.” I use the term “open copyright” rather than
“open access” here to point up the fact that much of the universally accessible
information we rely upon today is protected by copyright law. The creators of Webposted copyright-qualifying information goods are generally copyright proprietors,
having rights no different than any other copyright proprietors. The creator of an
original story posted on a Web page has a standing under copyright law that is
essentially no different than the author of a New York Times bestseller.

See, e.g, LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS 187-190 (2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 151-165 (2001); Jessica Litman, War
Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002).
23 See F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH.
L.J. 293 (2001); David G. Post, His Napster’s Voice, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 35, 43 (2001)
(reflecting upon the unprecedented and unpredicted vitality and diversity of Internet-based content).
24 See Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, at 101-08 (July 1945), at
http:// www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/computer/bushf.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).
25 KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF
THE INTERNET 38 (1996) (describing J.C.R. Licklider’s “Intergalactic Computer Network”).
26 See supra note __ (regarding Peter Suber’s overview of “open access”).
22

F6F

LASTOWKA – DIGITAL ATTRIBUTION

ROUGH DRAFT OF 7/14/2006

One of the most interesting features of open copyright today is that it is
dominated by amateurs.27 Dan Hunter and I have used the term “amateurs” to
describe most open copyright creators not because their work is of low quality, but
because it is shared outside of the traditional profit-oriented chains of copyright
production. There are numerous examples of major genres of amateur-dominated
open copyright today: e.g., blogs posted to the servers of Blogger.com and Typepad,28
encyclopedia entries posted to the servers owned by Wikipedia,29 brief films posted to
the servers owned by YouTube,30 digital photos posted to servers of Flickr,31
personal profiles, images, and audio posted on MySpace, group discussions, fan
fiction, and fan art posted to Yahoo Groups or AOL,32 open source software
projects, and, of course, the traditional Web page.
The size of open copyright is staggering. The precise extent of the World
Wide Web is unclear, but recent estimates suggest the Web now contains roughly 12
billion web pages.33 Assuming the average web page is a 25 kilobyte textual file
(which is likely a substantial underestimate), that means the World Wide Web holds
roughly 30 terabytes of information. As a point of comparison, one expert’s
calculation puts the size of the textual information in the Library of Congress at
about that same size: 26 terabytes.34 These estimates may be off (it is not clear in
which direction) but if the sheer weight of information on the World Wide Web
today has not yet exceeded the size of the equivalent information in the Library of
Congress, it will do so within the next few years.
The sphere of open copyright, in other words, is probably not much smaller—
and may even be greater—than the sphere of material flowing through traditional
copyright channels. For better or for worse, it appears that open copyright forms of

See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951,
956 (2004); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 53-55 (2006).
28 See, e.g., Technorati, at http://www.technorati.com/.
29 See, e.g., Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page..
30 See You Tube, at http://www.youtube.com/.
31 See, e.g., Flickr, at http://www.flickr.com/.
32 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions, Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. LA
ENT. L.J. 651 (1997).
33 See John Markoff, In Silicon Valley, a Debate Over the Size of the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/15/technology/15search.html (estimating the size of the Web at
between 8 billion and 19 billion pages); Antonio Gulli & Alessio Signorini, The Indexable Web is more
than 11.5 billion pages, http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~asignori/web-size/ (May 2005).
34 The rough calculation was made by Brewster Kahle, and notably was based on textual coding,
not images. See Brewster Kahle, Universal Access to All Human Knowledge (Nov. 20, 2002),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/lectures/kahle.html.
27
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information are rapidly becoming at least as influential in modern society as
information flowing through the traditional copyright channels. This is due, at least
in part, to the fact that open copyright information is so easy to access. For many
information needs, most people may lack the inclination to seek out the best source
held at the Library of Congress or in a physical media store or in a paid database.
The open copyright information on the Web may suffer in terms of a quality
comparison,35 but it can be summoned freely in an instant to the average computer
screen. This is a powerful marketplace advantage, to say the least.
Open copyright practices (including free software) are now a meaningful part
of the contemporary information economy.36 Most of us are now reliant upon a Web
of online open copyright content for discovering useful information, participating in
communities, entertaining ourselves, and expressing ideas.37 From the standpoint of
consumer/creators, access to open copyright information and the ability to
contribute to the open copyright sphere is providing ever-increasing social benefits.
We might expect that the copyright law would be paying attention to the causes,
effects, and broader implications of open copyright. So far it has not.

C. Explaining the Lack of Legal Responses to Open Copyright
The sphere of open copyright has so far had very little impact on the law of
intellectual property. There are many possible reasons for this. One obvious reason
is that open copyright is essentially extra-legal in the commercial information
marketplace, making it therefore invisible to a copyright law designed to order that
marketplace.38

The recent quality comparisons between the open copyright Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia
Britannica are one example of the debates that are taking place. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS 70-74 (2006). My personal view is that Wikipedia and Encyclopedia
Britannica are simply two very different things—but I will not launch on an extended digression
here.
36 Hal R. Varian, The Internet carries profound implications for providers of information, NEW YORK TIMES,
Jul. 27, 2000 (“Today, tens of thousands of musicians, amateur and professional, freely distribute
their music over the Internet. Fee-to-listen music will have to compete with this free-to-listen
music…”).
37 Various studies concerning the use of the Web in the daily activities of the average U.S. citizen
can be found at the website of the Pew Internet & American Life Project. See
<http://www.pewinternet.org/>. According to the Pew surveys, more than 50 million Americans
rely on the Internet for daily news, more than 40 million surf the Internet for pleasure, and more
than 53 million have created content online.
38 Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE
L. J. ___ (2006) (“Lawyers and legal scholars understandably focus mostly on domains of life where
35
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Open copyright amateurs have, quite understandably, done little to remedy the
situation. Though, in the aggregate, amateurs make very important contributions to
the public wealth of information, they generally lack the funds, the skills, and the
interest to participate in the complicated machinations of intellectual property
legislation that occur in Washington. Unlike the entertainment industries, they do
not employ lobbyists or make targeted contributions to key political leaders. They are
also less likely to press their concern before courts: when one’s method of operation
is to provide one’s copyright-protected work to the public without remuneration, it is
not always sensible to front the costs of hiring an attorney when an exclusive right is
violated.
The voices of open copyright are spread diffusely ways across the population,
whereas the firms who profit from copyright entitlements are organized, funded, and
capable of pooling resources for focused political action. Commercially motivated
industries can and do pay to have their positions on the laws of copyright brought to
the attention of Washington legislators. Public choice theory explains that in such a
situation, regulation will tend toward industry capture and away from the optimal
protection of the more diffuse and disaggregated public interest.39
The entertainment and publishing industries also have strategic reasons to
persuade lawmakers to ignore the importance of open copyright practices. The
stronger property protections that stand to increase their profits can often be
rhetorically justified by claims that society is suffering because traditional laws are no
longer working effectively to create incentives for the production of new works.
Keeping Congress and the public focused on a story of rampant digital piracy and
economic loss accomplishes their objectives—it justifies calls for stronger digital
copyright laws. Drawing attention to the contemporary spread of open copyright
practices, on the other hand, produces cognitive dissonance. When open copyright is
mentioned, the preferred rhetorical strategy used by the copyright industry is often
dismissal: open copyright is framed as either poor in quality, economically
inconsequential,40 and/or anti-capitalist in sentiment.41

law is central.”).
39 See Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529,
531-32 (2000) (noting that the problems predicted by public choice theory are particularly acute in
the content of intellectual property law); Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT L.J. 567, 568 (2006) (“As a result of special-interest capture, the Copyright Act confers overly
broad rights to copyright owners at the expense of the public interest in having access to creative
works.”); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 375 (2005) (describing Creative Commons as a response
to the problems caused by industry capture of copyright).
40 Just to take one random example, Patrick Ross of the Progress & Freedom Foundation
recently posted a weblog criticism of a presentation by Yochai Benkler, and stated that “Wikipedia
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Oddly enough, many legal academic observers have also been somewhat
indifferent to the upside of the digital information revolution. One reason for this
may be that they are convinced, like some of those in the entertainment industry, that
open copyright is not “quality” copyright. They might also have little to say about it
because it produces little in the way of case law, for reasons noted above. Even if
they value open copyright, those sympathetic to the “copyleft” may feel a need to
stay on the frontlines of a culture war.42 Because open copyright actually embodies
the ideal of the goals of promoting public access, the sphere of open copyright is
generally left unattended and energy is devoted to solving perceived problems created
by the efforts of copyright industries. When open copyright practices are invoked,
they are often drafted, rhetorically, to serve in copyleft agendas. For instance,
Lawrence Lessig and others tend to use rhetoric that implicitly frames amateur
creativity on the World Web Web as evidence of a larger grassroots political
process.43

D.

The Motivations of Open Copyright

Within some circles of open copyright production, a quasi-political reading of
open copyright practices seems perfectly appropriate: open copyright practices are, in
some cases, clearly motivated by counter-copyright ideological agendas. With regard
to free and open source software, for instance, the community of hackers tends to be
both articulate about copyright and culturally productive.44 Resistance among that
community to the perceived harms that flow from copyright in computer software is
well-documented.45 Within communities of individuals who contribute to “open

[doesn’t] contribute in any meaningful way to the US economy.” See
<http://weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/2006/05/benkler_and_the.html>. If one requires the
exchange of dollars for information, this is a correct appraisal of Wikipedia’s contributions to the
economy—but the economics of information are considerably more complex than that.
41 See, e.g., Andrew Keen, Web 2.0: The second generation of the Internet has arrived. It’s worse than you
think, THE DAILY STANDARD, Feb. 13, 2006. As explained infra, I believe some of this is half-true.
42 Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1105, 1117, 1130 (2005).
43 Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1105, 1117, 1130 (2005); Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004).
44 E. Gabriella Coleman, The Social Construction of Freedom in Free and Open Source Software: Hackers,
Ethics, and the Liberal Tradition (August 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago)
(on file with author); DOUGLAS THOMAS, HACKER CULTURE 10-11 (University of Minnesota Press
2002).
45 For excellent discussion of the legal issues raised by “open source” and “copyleft” software, see
Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS
L. J. 53 (2004) (critiquing open source licensing practices); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of
Open-Source Software, 2 UTAH L. REV. 563 (2004) (arguing for a stripe of “moral rights” protection for
open source software).
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source” software projects, the moral and ethical dimensions of intellectual property
are constantly being debated and re-articulated.46
The issue of software has, due to its peculiar nature, been on the frontline of
challenges to copyright policy. For decades, copyright law has had to struggle with
the protection of computer programs. In 1974, Congress established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) largely
because it was uncertain that software was a proper subject for copyright
protection.47 CONTU’s 1978 Final Report concluded that it was.48 Yet there have
always been those, including many computer programmers, who steadfastly resisted
this conclusion, arguing that software and copyright do not make a good match.49
For instance, a 1994 manifesto by Professor Pamela Samuelson and others argued in
favor of a sui generis regime of software protection.50
Perhaps the most well-known opponent of software copyright is Richard
Stallman, who founded the Free Software Movement in 1984. Stallman has long
expressed his opposition to proprietary software, and is often described as a
“pioneer” and “visionary”51 who has built a popular movement around his beliefs.
The General Counsel of Stallman’s Free Software Foundation is Columbia law
professor Eben Moglen. Moglen has also spoken out publicly against the
“propertization” of software.52 In 1999, he wrote an article in an online journal that

Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525,
1528-1529 (2004) (discussing the relevance of ethical “sharing” to copyright).
47 Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 114-16 (2004).
48 See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection For
Computer Programs In Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 665 (1984); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory
Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 114-16 (2004). Some legal commentators, like Arthur Miller, wrote
important articles agreeing with this conclusion. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV.
977 (1993).
49 Pamela Samuelson et al., CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection For Computer
Programs In Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 665 (1984).
50 Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning
The Legal Protection Of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2312-13 & n.6 (1994) (citing to
“voluminous” literature on the question). The joint manifesto noted that it was written in reaction to
a more dominant trend. Id. (“[T]he idea of sui generis protection for software has generally fallen out
of favor since the United States, Japan, and the European Union, among others, decided to use
copyright to protect programs.”)
51 Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36
RUTGERS L. J. 53, 83 (2004).
52 Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 FIRST MONDAY 8
(Aug. 2, 1999), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/. See also Dan Hunter,
Culture War, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1105 (2005) (discussing Moglen’s “dotCommunist” theories).
46
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attacked copyright and patent protections for software.53 Moglen argued that
intellectual property laws would soon be rendered insignificant by the triumph of free
software and anarchic modes of information production.54 The normative beliefs
and philosophies of Stallman and Moglen are in obvious conflict with the companies
that make money from software licensing.55
For instance, Microsoft, probably the greatest financial beneficiary of the
CONTU-endorsed regime of proprietary software, has understandably never
expressed much enthusiasm for the development of non-proprietary software.56
According to Bill Gates, progress in the software industry is dependent upon the
promise to developers of proprietary rights.57 The Free Software Foundation, for its
part, is less than enthusiastic about the practices of Microsoft. It features a webpage
that asks and answers the question “Is Microsoft the Great Satan?” The page
emphasizes that Microsoft is only one of many companies who improperly attempt to
turn software into legal property.58
These ongoing debates over copyright and software are worth careful
attention. Understanding them is essential to those who are making copyright policy
for software. But it may be equally important to get past them in order to understand
the broader picture of open copyright practices today. The ideological fervor and
pitched rhetoric that often characterizes debates among free software cognoscenti do
not seem to be characteristic of the viewpoints of many amateurs engaging in other
forms of open copyright practices.
Most individuals who create blogs, post photos online, or contribute to
Wikipedia seem only vaguely aware of current debates over intellectual property. If
the average proprietor of an open copyright work knows what a copyright is, he
probably lacks any clear notions of where he stands on copyright reform. And in

53 See Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY
(1999) <http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/anarchism.html>.
54 Id.
55 It is worth clarifying that the Free Software Foundation is not opposed to those who charge
for the delivery of software on media—the enemy in their view is not the business of software, but
the legal regime that makes code proprietary.
56 This has been true of Gates’ position since at least 1976, when he published an “Open Letter
to Hobbyists” that claimed piracy and lack of payments for software prevented good software from
being written. See Amy Harmon, The Rebel Code, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999 at F34; Open
Letter to Hobbyists,
<http://www.digibarn.com/collections/newsletters/homebrew/V2_01/homebrew_V2_01_p2.jpg>
57 Id.
58 See Is Microsoft the Great Satan, < http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/microsoft.html>.
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fact, it is not uncommon for those who provide open copyright content on the Web
to make highly aggressive claims of copyright ownership. In other words, while some
degree of ideological awareness may be important in some domains of open
copyright creativity, a more persuasive explanation for the flowering of open
copyright today may be a new kind of economic model enabled by technological
progress.
Because the costs of copyright-relevant technology have dropped in recent
years, the costs of entry into the copyright game have dropped. In this situation, it is
predictable that given some modicum of competition among information producers,
the costs of copyright-protected works would drop and the savings in production
costs would be passed along to consumers. This is a very simple concept, displayed
graphically below.

High

Cost of
Consumer
purchase price
production
&
market price

Zero dollar
price point

Number of
producers
Low

Trend imposed by digital
information technologies

With practically any form of technological progress, decreased production
costs leads to reduced prices and greater consumer wealth. There are only two things
about this graph that are somewhat peculiar to open copyright. First, the number of
copyright producers is increasing.59 Second, the trend in open copyright is toward a

59 In many cases, reduced production costs might lead to a smaller number of producers as easily
as a larger number. The growth of copyright producers today is largely due to the fact that copyright
creation is intimately intertwined with technologies of fixation. For many people, traditional
practices of “communication” are now being labeled “production” due to their fixation. The
conversational blog is a copyright-protected work—the morning conversation at the bus stop is not.
See generally Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951,
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price point of zero. The second trend may seem puzzling.60 As Bill Gates asked
computer hobbyists in 1976: “Who can afford to do professional work for
nothing?”61
Even open copyright “amateurs” must make investments in order to produce
and distribute their creations. Weblogs, digital photos, fan fiction, and other forms of
popularly generated Web-based open copyright content are not costless. They all
require, at a minimum, investments of time. The costs of relevant technologies of
production and distribution may have dropped in recent years, but they are still above
zero. Yet many open copyright producers do not have clear business strategies and
do not seem to profit from open copyright in any monetary sense. Given the
apparent irrationality of the production, some ideological motivation (like altruism or
commitment to the copyleft agenda) may seem to provide the best answer to the
puzzle.
Unraveling what Yochai Benkler has termed “non-market” production is a
complex matter.62 The adjective “amateur,” which generally denotes non-market
forms of work, has mixed connotations. In one sense, it signals a failure to obtain
the status of “professional,” which is generally considered prestigious. Amateurs are
those who do not do things properly, seriously, and “professionally.” To suggest, as
Dan Hunter and I have, that copyright law is being overrun by a bunch of amateurs
may seem like a way of criticizing, not celebrating, that phenomenon.63 On the other
hand, calling attention to the lack of a profit motive can signal a form of approval.
There is a long (if not uniform) history within many communities of artistic
959 (2004) (“Technologically fixed copies have been removed from their privileged status and have
become part of the processes of conversation.”).
60 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 5 (2006) (suggesting that “free”
information production “run[s] against the grain of some of our most basic Economics 101
intuitions”).
61 See Open Letter to Hobbyists,
<http://www.digibarn.com/collections/newsletters/homebrew/V2_01/homebrew_V2_01_p2.jpg>
. Gates further noted that he would be able to create jobs if a more proprietary approach to software
was accepted: “Nothing would please me more than being able to hire ten programmers and deluge
the hobby market with good software.” Id. Cf. Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in
Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15 (1997)
(“[M]any predict that intellectual property creators will be reluctant to create works for the Internet
environment since creators will be unable to protect their copyright interests”).
62 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 43 (2006) (chart contrasting “market”
and “nonmarket” “information production strategies”); Richard A. Lanham, Barbie and the Teacher of
Righteousness: Two Lessons in the Economics of Attention, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 499, 523 (2001) (suggesting
that in an “attention economy,” copyright utility is derived from the extreme polarities of “fame” and
“play”).
63 See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951,
956 (2004).
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production of viewing financial gain as a contaminant to artistic integrity—to work
only for financial gain is viewed as a type of corruption.64 Amateurs are characterized
by the virtue of being “uncorrupted” by the influence of money on their work. They
have access to a potentially superior status, in the eyes of some, because they have
clearly not “sold out.”
As Viviana Zelizer and Margaret Radin have noted, the presence or absence of
direct economic exchanges can have complex social and legal framings: the various
systems of social currency we use are not fully commensurable.65 Consider wine and
flowers. Obviously, one cannot obtain these at most wineries or florists with
“payments” of gratitude. But neither can money be substituted for those products in
other circumstances. A gift of wine to a friend providing dinner or a gift of flowers
following a romantic rendezvous might be considered an appropriate expression of
gratitude, whereas a direct monetary payment would be offensive.66
Comparable social norms can and do exist against the appropriation and
monetization of creative production in some contexts.67 Indeed, the arguments of
Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig often seem to draw importantly upon the
rhetoric of non-market virtues. Zero-price information practices are translated into
expressions of communitarian populism resisting intellectual property laws as the
instrumental expressions of corporate greed.
Within histories of software
development, one can often find the rhetoric of bands of wily and wooly “hackers”
challenging and toppling impersonal profit-focused corporate giants. A mythology of

See Marc Perlman, Art, Commerce, and Ambivalence in the Moral Psychology of File-Sharing (working
draft of 17-20 November 2005) (investigating the interplay of commercial motivations and the ethics
of artistic production); Donaldson v. Becket ________ (“Glory is the reward of science, and those who
deserve it scorn all meaner views.”).
65 VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 817 (2000); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV.
491, 493 (2005) (noting that the “legal connection between intimate relationships and economic
exchange is… subtle and complex.”).
66 Neil Duxbury and Yochai Benkler have used these same examples, pointing out the apparent
incommensurability of friendship and cash. Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61
BROOKLYN L. REV. 657, 675-77 (1995); id. at 676 (“cash valuations-irrespective of how high or low
such valuations may be-are inconsistent with the manner in which we value friends, and thus we treat
the two goods as incommensurable”); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 92-99
(2006) (discussing the social meaning of monetary exchange and its role in motivation).
67 See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
423, 432 (2005). See generally CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
1-108 (MIT Press 2005) (offering anthropological and sociological perspectives on various cultural
property economics).
64
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counter-cultural ascendancy runs deep among the digerati and has carried over to the
current day debates over digital copyright.68 It is fair to say that for some of those
who identify with and participate in Lessig’s “free culture” movement, the trend
toward mass amateurization in digital copyright is understood as tantamount to a
progressive political revolution.69
I do not wish to disparage or underplay the importance of progressive social
consciousness in some forms of open copyright production. However, ideological
motivations surely do not characterize much of open copyright. The recognition of
the creator’s self-interest still has a role to play in copyright law, even in the absence
of the assertion of proprietary rights. Even though an amateur creator may not
realize a pecuniary gain from open copyright practices, this does not mean that they
fail to produce economically real returns. Even while open copyright production is,
in some sense, a “non-market” form of production (it does not produce financial
compensation) it produces a private return: enhanced personal reputation within a
particular community that is often highly relevant to the copyright producer in
question. This was Ralph Shaw’s whole point half a century ago: authors often create
not in pursuit of money, but in pursuit of attention and recognition.70
Promoting personal reputation within a particular community is certainly not
the sole motivator for open copyright production, but I would wager it is among the
top two.71 The motivational role of reputation can be identified in the histories of

STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 23-35 (1984); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 9, 11
(2001) (“The prevailing rhetoric in academe and in the press tends to portray those who seek to
protect their works against unauthorized copying (never mind alteration) as Goliath copyright owners
who strain to preserve their mastodontic business models against the happy hacking Davids who
only want free speech on the Net.”).
69 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEXAS L. REV.
1105, 1117, 1130 (2005).
70 Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 572 (1951). The claim that
artistic creativity can be motivated largely by the pursuit of “fame” is not uncommon. See, e.g. John T.
Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72
WASH. L. REV. 709, 764-66 (1997) (“[M]any artists are unique in that they want recognition for
recognition's sake… [F]ame itself provides part, or maybe even all, of the motivation for creative
activity...”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1 (1997); Richard A. Lanham, Barbie and the
Teacher of Righteousness: Two Lessons in the Economics of Attention, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 499, 523 (2001).
71 Indeed, Yochai Benkler suggests the pursuit of reputation benefits is perhaps the primary
motivational engine of both his types of “non-exclusionary” (open) copyright creation. YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 43 (suggesting that “non-exclusion, market” production is
motivated by writing “to get clients” and to “advertise” while “non-exclusion, non-market”
production is motivated by writing “in return for status, benefits to reputation.”).
In addition to reputation, I think Richard Lanham’s suggestion that an impulse toward “play” lies
68
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various forms of creative production. Open-source pundit Eric Raymond suggested
in his book The Cathedral and the Bazzar: “The ‘utility function’ Linux hackers are
maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible of their own ego
satisfaction and reputation among other hackers.”72 As evidence of this, it might be
noted that free and open source software (“F/OSS”) is often characterized by a trade
of copyright protections for the requirement of attribution.73 One of the most open
source software projects, the Apache server software, imposes only one requirement:
the provision of attribution to its creators.74
A recent study by Professor Randal Davis of the Computer Science and
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also provides evidence of
the importance of attribution and reputation in open copyright practices.75 Professor
Davis’s study reported on an informal survey used to assess the attitudes of his
computer science department toward intellectual property. According to Davis, the
majority of his survey participants behaved according to Ralph Shaw’s prediction.
They opted for the price that would best maximize their reputation gains: zero.
Davis concluded that the researchers and hackers he surveyed “work for reputation,
the recognition of their expertise, accomplishments, and contributions.”76
The same information practices are common among law professors with
regard to their primary intellectual product: the law review article. Many law
professors engage in the labor required to post their principal intellectual property on
their web pages and elsewhere for free. They even spend research budgets on
distributing reprints of their work. Some law professors are additionally devoting
significant amounts of time to writing weblogs, another laborious activity dominated

behind many forms of authorial creativity is an idea that is worth more careful investigation. Richard
A. Lanham, Barbie and the Teacher of Righteousness: Two Lessons in the Economics of Attention, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 499, 523 (2001). See also JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY (2006) (describing how play and work
are interrelated in complex ways); JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY
ELEMENT IN CULTURE (1938) (describing how a student of play informs understandings of cultural
practices); Greg Lastowka, Law and Games Studies, 1 GAMES & CULTURE 25 (2005).
72 ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR __ (1999).
73 Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36
RUTGERS L. J. 53, 57 (2004); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2 UTAH
L. REV. 563, 672-75 (2004) (noting the role that attribution plays in motivating open source software
creation).
74 Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36
RUTGERS L. J. 53, 74 (2004).
75 Professor Davis was the principal author of THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1.
76 See Randall Davis, Dilemmas Faced by Creative People in IT, Position paper for Princeton
University - Microsoft Intellectual Property Conference, May 12, 2005 at 1, available online at:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/davis/Dilemma.pdf.
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by open copyright practices.77 While there may be motivations of altruism among
law professor bloggers, I think we can presume that law professors are, at least as
much as the average person, rational economic actors.78 Like the hackers described
by Davis, law professors are probably blogging—at least in part—for community
reputation and recognition.
The pursuit of reputational standing creates incentives for information sharing
in realms outside the scope of copyright law. An interesting recent survey by
Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel suggests that within the community of
French chefs, recipes are generally guarded as trade secrets.79 Techniques of culinary
production, while not typically policed by intellectual property laws, constitute a
valuable form of knowledge. However, according to Fauchart and von Hippel, some
chefs will select “their more important and interesting recipes to reveal [to the
public], reasoning that their reputation will be more effectively enhanced by revealing
major rather than minor innovations.”80 The most important norm that Fauchart and
von Hippel identified with regard to this type of information sharing was the
expectation of proper attribution.81
The close relation of such reputation economies to pecuniary markets is
important to see. The pursuit of reputation and economic reward may be in tension
in some cases, yet they are much more often complimentary pursuits. Among the
hackers described by Raymond, the demonstration of proficiency in coding will quite
often lead to better employment prospects (for volunteer contributions to coding
projects) and within professional communities of computer scientists, reputation
benefits can be difficult to disentangle from professional advancement.82 Fauchart
and von Hippel note the same connection with regard to French chefs, who, when

77 Professor Dan Solove has posted a regular (informal) census of law professors who blog. See
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/11/law_professor_b_1.html
78 Lest there be any doubt about the economic rationality of blogging, it should be observed that
several members of the faculty at the University of Chicago Law School have a blog, as does Judge
Richard Posner. See http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/.
79 Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-based intellectual property systems: the case of French
chefs, MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4576-06 (Jan. 2006).
80 Id. at __.
81 Id. at __.
82 Catherine Fisk’s work is particularly perceptive and noteworthy in this regard: it links the right
of attribution, often framed as a matter of intellectual property law, to the law of employment. See
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, forthcoming ___.
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they bolster their popular reputations, also tend to attract patrons, their primary
source of income.83
Obtaining enhanced standing within a community may also serve as an
“intrinsic” motivator.84 In other words, popular attention can be, and is, often
pursued for its own sake. My claim here is not that basic monetary goals lurk behind
the pursuit of reputation—in some cases they may, but the matter is more complex
than that. My point is that while the pursuit of reputation may be a different kind of
incentive than the incentive of monetary payments, exchanges between these two
currencies are common. As Thorstein Veblen observed many years ago, even those
who pursue monetary wealth may be ultimately in pursuit of the reputational good of
social stature within a particular community.85 Reputational incentives are deeply
intertwined with the workings of market economies and market economies are deeply
intertwined with the dynamics of reputation—for many, these motivations may be
flip sides of the same coin.
One might object that hackers, computer scientists, French chefs, and law
professors are idiosyncratic data points in the information economy. However, many
“professional” creators are also now participating in open copyright practices. For
profit-driven firms, zero-price copyright production is not beyond the pale where it
can be justified by some other important benefit. Advertising, which I mention in the
next section, is proof of this. Other forms of zero-price output may be crosssubsidized by advertising (this has long been the case with over-the-air broadcasts of
radio and television), sales of associated goods and services, or alternative business
strategies.86 There are many examples of such models today—for instance, the online
version of The New York Times and The Washington Post have largely abandoned price-

Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-based intellectual property systems: the case of French
chefs, MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4576-06 at ___ (Jan. 2006).
84 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 94 (2006).
85 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899) __ (“Conspicuous
consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the gentleman of leisure.”); Yochai
Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production,
114 YALE L.J. 273, 325 (2004).
86 Eric Goldman noted this almost a decade ago. See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property
Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 15 (1997):
[T]he profit-maximizing price on the Internet may be where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost [i.e. zero cost & price] because intellectual property will be
cross-subsidized by other products in a manner sufficient to cover the fixed
costs associated with intellectual property creation and distribution. If this is
true, a market price of zero for intellectual property can still create long-term
economic profits attributable to intellectual property creation.
83
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based sales models for their information and follow an online variant of the
broadcast television model, where advertising provides the primary source of
revenue.
The primary lesson here is that while open copyright practices do have some
involvement with particular ideologies about the propriety of monetary exchange for
creative work, their current prominence can be rationalized by models based upon
the maximization of community reputation. Those who set a price of zero for their
creative output have always been capable of realizing important non-monetary
returns. They are simply now able, via network technologies, to respond to very old
incentives. The cost-benefit analysis that Ralph Shaw recognized many years ago is
playing out on a new stage: many forms of copyright production are drifting toward a
zero price strategy and the maximization of reputational currency. The key question
is: how should copyright law respond? The next section answers that question with
Shaw’s prescription. Attribution must become more central to copyright law.

II. Laws of Credit & Attribution
A. The “Law of Advertising”
The relevance of advertising to open copyright is obvious: as mentioned
above, advertising has proved to be one of the key cross-subsidizing techniques used
to sustain “professional” open copyright business models.87 Yet it should also be
understood that advertisements themselves fall within the definition of open
copyright. Understanding the dynamics and the policy concerns of advertising may
be helpful in understanding how law should respond to open copyright.
It may seem harsh or heretical to suggest that open copyright and advertising
are closely related. The normative valences here are obviously different. Yet there are
many similarities between advertising and open copyright.88 This is not a new idea:

Advertising is, of course, the primary source of revenue for Google. Advertising also supports
many of the “free” hosting services for blogs and online communities. The major newspaper
companies that provide open copyright content over the Web are also primarily reliant on advertising
to finance their businesses.
88
There are many differences as well—primarily the “commercial” valence of advertising that
becomes such an important normative and political issue for those who see open copyright as an
ideological practice and advertising as a commercial plague. Open copyright will likely not provoke
acts of principled resistance by Adbusters or the Billboard Liberation Front. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO
LOGO xxi-xxii (2000) (describing instances of anti-branding activism); Rosemary Coombe & Andrew
Herman, Trademarks, Property, And Propriety: The Moral Economy Of Consumer Politics And Corporate
Accountability On The World Wide Web, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 599 (2000) (describing the Billboard
87

F 20 F

LASTOWKA – DIGITAL ATTRIBUTION

ROUGH DRAFT OF 7/14/2006

In 1951, Ralph Shaw stated that: “Publication of contributions to knowledge is the
only form of advertising considered ethical among the professions.”89 Open
copyright’s reputation dynamics and zero-price model do seem to place it, as a formal
matter, somewhere between the much-maligned cultural form of (zero-priced)
consumer advertising and the much more respectable (positive-priced) creative works
such as books, music, and films. This suggests that, in seeking to adapt copyright law
to open copyright practices, the “law of advertising” might provide some guidance.
Advertisements are creative forms of information. Like paintings, novels, and
software, advertisements take creativity and labor to produce, and are legally
protected by copyright as forms of original expression.90 Television advertisements,
to take one example, employ many of the same creative techniques (e.g. narrative,
orchestrated scores, special effects, and celebrities) that are found in popular films.
Successful advertising is perhaps just as formally challenging as any other creative
genre because the advertiser must engage and amuse viewers (sometimes against their
will) while conveying a particular message that encourages a particular activity
(generally the purchase of goods and services).
Advertising is, by definition, distributed at zero price. As discussed in the
prior section, setting a zero price for laborious creation seems like an economic
puzzle. The advertiser (generally speaking, the business financing the creation and
distribution of the advertisement, not the creative team) fails to recoup the costs of
production via the sale of the creative product. Yet few would deny that advertising
makes business sense for the firm in much the same way that open copyright does for
the individual: when the potential positive reputation and attention benefits that flow
from creating and distributing information to the public exceed the cost of
investment requirements, there can be a positive return on a zero price.
Like the computer scientists in Davis’s survey, advertisers attempt to build
reputation capital. Just as some open source software creators seek to extend the
social penetration of their practices through practices of “viral licensing,”91 so many
Liberation Front); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES
73-76 (1998) (describing “activist appropriations”); Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, forthcoming
____.
89 Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 572 (1951).
90 The seminal case is Justice Holmes’ opinion in Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 US
239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he special adaptation of these pictures to the advertisement of the
Wallace shows does not prevent a copyright.”). That has been the law ever since. See, e.g., Leibovitz v.
Paramount Pictures Corporation, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright infringement action based on a
picture used as a magazine cover); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT 2.08[G][4] (2005); 119 HARV. L. REV. at 2487.
91 Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36
RUTGERS L. J. 53, 81-82 (2004)
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advertisers are currently exploring the use of so-called “viral” mechanisms designed
to “infect” the creative work of others, harnessing the energy of the public to
promote their brand messages beyond their direct creative control or financing.92
For corporations, while advertising is primarily about driving the sales of
products and services, it can also serve some of the intrinsic functions that were
discussed with regard to open copyright. Ad campaigns help to build positive
reputations around a business name, help to improve employee morale, and perhaps
even provide some rough corporate analogue to the “egoboo” coveted by open
source programmers.93
Yet, much like open copyright, advertising is generally ignored in discussions
of copyright law—a recent student note in the Harvard Law Review even suggests that
copyright law should jettison protection for advertising.94 Reciprocally, one can find
treatises on the “law of advertising” that generally ignore the issue of copyright.95

Chris Gaither, A Web Contagion: ‘Viral’ ads gives companies an unconventional method of spreading a
message online, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at C1 (“Viral ads -- also called pass-along ads -- spread by
word of mouse: The goal is to make the ads so funny, charming, sexy, or controversial that viewers email them to friends or post them on websites.”); Pia Sarkar, A different way of selling clothes: Gap’s
animated online stripper latest viral ad to get attention as firms seek new ways to reach buyers, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Aug. 27, 2005, at C1 (“Companies have increasingly turned to viral ads -- ads that
spread like viruses through word of mouth or e-mail forwards -- as television and radio continue to
lose their audiences to TiVo and iPods.”).
This footnote will now become a vehicle for viral marketing by way of a personal anecdote about
viral marketing (that is relevant, I hope, to the substance of the footnote). I recently received a new
“beta” model multi-media cell phone as part of the “Sprint Ambassador Program.” See
http://ambassador.sprint.com/Faq.aspx. Pursuant to my agreement with Sprint, I had no obligation
to do anything and I received a very fancy new cell phone with service for six months. Apparently
this offer was extended to me because Sprint believed I just might tell some other people about the
phone—which I have now done.
93 See DAVID OGILVY, OGILVY ON ADVERTISING 117 (1983) (Corporate advertising can
improve the morale of your employees… It can also make it easier to recruit better people, at all
levels.”)
94 For a recent argument that advertisements should not be protected by copyright law, see Note:
Rethinking Copyright for Advertisements, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2486, 2487 (2006):
Because granting copyright protection to advertisements appears unnecessary to
induce the creation and dissemination of ads, and because it is not clear that
copyright protection provides the public with a meaningful net benefit…
presuming advertisements to be copyrightable subject matter - and thus treating
them as commensurate with other copyrightable works - is unjustified.
92

While I deeply appreciate the student editor’s point about the lack of fiscal incentives necessary for
advertising, I am not sure I can agree with the student editor that “a judge can make reasoned
decisions regarding what constitutes art.” Id. at 2506. This will be explored a bit infra.
95 See generally GEORGE E. ROSDEN & PETER E. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING
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The “law of advertising” is generally thought to be synonymous with the law of
trademark and unfair competition.96
This is curious. What it might suggest is that our legal attitude toward
information goods distributed at zero-price to promote reputations is substantially
different than our attitude toward traditionally information goods distributed for sale.
When law confronts advertising works, its role shifts from the copyright model of
creating property-based creation incentives to the communication model of
protecting reputation and preventing deception.
It should be noted, however, that describing advertising as a zero-price
information form is more a matter of tradition than any careful analysis of what role
advertising plays in society. Increasingly, the thing that we have called “advertising”
in the past plays a substantial role in “professional” copyright production—in other
words, advertising can be found in copyright markets that are not characterized by
zero prices.97 Promoting reputations and brands, sending persuasive rhetorical
messages, and attempting to influence popular opinion are all things we can find in
information that is sold today under the copyright model.
Popular
Consider contemporary children’s entertainment offerings.98
children’s cartoons like Pokemon,® Clifford,® Rescue Heroes,® Winne-the Pooh,®
and Bratz,® are all undeniably copyright-protected works, sold on VHS and DVD as
well as in traditional book forms. They are also (effectively) advertisements for
extensive lines of affiliated toys, games, bedsheets, backpacks, and other products.
Children watching these programs are, in a sense, watching very well-made
advertisements that are additionally cross-subsidized by advertising.
The Harry Potter® franchise epitomizes the impossibility of drawing bright
lines today between content and advertising. Harry Potter® is, unquestionably, the
protagonist in an award-winning series of literary stories. Harry does double duty,
however, as a brand-licensing juggernaut for all manner of commercial flotsam and
jetsam that bear his extremely valuable trademark. One simply cannot escape from
Harry Potter’s fame. He is even a font of legal wisdom.99 As Jessica Litman has
(Matthew Bender 2004).
96 Id.
97 For a thorough treatment of the permeation of advertising messages into copyright markets, see
Ellen Goodman, Stealth Marketing, forthcoming -_____.
98 Recent films like Fahrenheit 9/11 or The Passion of the Christ might also be used as examples of
ideological and persuasive entertainment offerings, but the apparent indifference of most adults to
children’s programming has made it an ideal playground for advertainers.
99 Seriously. See, e.g., Jeff Thomas, Danaya Wright, James Charles Smith, Aaron Schwabach, Joel
Fishman, Daniel Austin Green, Timothy S. Hall, and Andrew P. Morriss, Harry Potter and the Law,
___ TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006); Susan Hall, Harry Potter and the Rule of Law:
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observed, popular content blurs into advertising and advertising blurs into cultural
vocabulary.100 In those areas of academia that operate outside the discourse of law
(especially within cultural studies), it is generally recognized that the texts of
advertising and the texts of Hollywood (whose purveyors have driven major
copyright reforms in the past decades) are not all that different.101
Seeing the connection between open copyright practices and advertising may
help advance the scholarly discourse over digital copyright in constructive ways. If
open copyright indeed reflects some familiar dynamics of advertising, open
copyright’s legal rules might be structured in ways that draw upon advertising’s legal
rules. Most importantly, copyright might be restructured in ways that recognize the
importance of attribution, which is at the heart of advertising.102

the Central Weakness of Legal Concepts in the Wizard World, in READING HARRY POTTER: CRITICAL
ESSAYS at 147-62 (Giselle Liza Anatol, ed. 2003); Paul R. Joseph & Lynn E. Wolf, The Law in Harry
Potter: A System Not Even a Muggle Could Love, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 193 (2003); William P MacNeil,
“Kidlit” as “Law-and-Lit”: Harry Potter and the Scales of Justice, 14 L. & LIT. 545 (2002). (In fact, I should
probably face up to the fact that Harry Potter® will likely have a greater influence on legal scholarship
than I will have, based on the number of law review articles where his name appears in the title.)
100 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717,
___ (1999).
The film “Time to Dream” by M. Night Shyamalan is an interesting example of this confusion.
The Shyamalan video can easily be found online by searching online for the director’s name and
“Time to Dream.” See Barbara Lippert, Awakening The Senses: M. Night Shyamalan stays true to his life,
vision in AmEx ad, ADWEEK.COM, March 13, 2006 (predicting that the advertisement “will have a big
viral presence on the Web.”). It might be worth noting that Shyamalan gave the money he made
from doing the spot to school scholarship and did not permit the advertisement to be aired in
theaters by American Express. Id.
101 See generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 36-38 (1972) (Annette Lavers, trans.)
(discussing the different advertising methods used for brands of detergent); GRANT MCCRACKEN,
CULTURE & CONSUMPTION 77-79 (1990) (discussing advertising as a method of the cultural
construction of meaning); JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
ADVERTISING IN AMERICA 1 (1994) (“[Advertisements] urge people to buy goods, but they also
signify a certain vision of the good life; they validate a way of being in the world. They focus private
fantasy; they sanction or subvert existing structures of economic and political power.”); ROSEMARY J.
COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 172-73 (1998) (explaining how
advertising messages enable the construction of personal and national identity); Michael E. Zega,
Advertising the Southwest, 43 JOURNAL OF THE SOUTHWEST 281(2001) (explaining the role that
advertising played in the cultural construction of the Southwest and its population expansion);
Marsha Bryant, Plath, Domesticity, and the Art of Advertising, 29 COLLEGE LITERATURE 17 (2002)
(explaining how the advertising of domesticity in the 1950's permeates the work of the American
poet Sylvia Plath); Carol J. Singley, From Women’s Movement to Momentum: Where Are We Going, Where
Have We Been, and Do We Need Nikes to Get There?, 25 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE
CULTURES 455 (2002) (discussing the issues raised by Nike® feminists).
102 See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could be
Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15 (1997) (“[F]or cross-subsidization to work,
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Where a provider of information can obtain essentially no market benefit
other than popular attention, proper attribution of the information to the source of
production is essential.103 The law is capable of providing this type of attribution
protection for authors of creative works, ensuring that those who invest in creating
new information products will reap the consumer goodwill that flow from those
investments.104
In the digital environment, protections for reliable authorial attribution should
be, to borrow Julie Cohen’s phrase, “one cornerstone of a well-balanced copyright
edifice.”105 As will be explained in the next section, however—attribution
protections in the realm of intellectual property law are in a sorry state, little
improved (and perhaps worse) than the state that Ralph Shaw criticized in 1951.

B. Copyright: VARA and the CMI Provisions of the DMCA
Generally speaking, copyright law in the United States provides few significant
protections for authorial attribution.106 European copyright systems do provide
protections for authorial attribution under the rubric of so-called “moral rights,”107
the personality-based rights of an artist that reflect a unique—perhaps spiritual—
connection between an individual artist and a work of art. Moral rights generally
cannot be alienated. Among the moral rights is the right of paternity, which carries
the connotation of a genetic connection between the author and the work. In

buyers impressed with product X (freely given away) must be led to product Y (for sale). In most
cases, this will mean that product X must give proper attribution to the seller of product Y so that
buyers can make the connection.”)
103 Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to Credit, 113 SCIENCE 2942 at 572 (May 18, 1951) (“If [a
scientific author’s] name need not be included, the incentive for publishing scientific literature would
be greatly reduced.”).
104 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 268-73 (1987)
105 See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348 (2005).
106 See Natalie C. Suhl, Note: Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A
Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1203-15 (2002); Karen L.
Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture
Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 91-92 (1994); Neil Netaniel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(1994).
107 The phrase “moral rights” is an unfortunate accident of translation, especially given the disdain
shown by legal pragmatists for the utility of “moral” discourse. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1998) (“[E]ven if moral theory
can provide a solid basis for some moral judgments, it should not be used as a basis for legal
judgments.”). A better translation would probably be “personality rights.”
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practice, the right of paternity functions as a right to credit—the author has the right
to be publicly acknowledged as a work’s creator.
In the United States, however, the moral right of paternity is generally not
recognized. A right of attribution is specifically mentioned in the copyright law only
as part of the Visual Artist Rights Act (“VARA”), codified at 17 U.S.C. §106A.108
VARA was enacted in order for the United States to meet its new international
obligations pursuant to the most important international copyright treaty, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.109 Pursuant to
amendments to Berne, signatories were required to recognize and implement a legal
order where the law would protect an author’s “right to claim authorship of the
work” independently of the author’s economic rights.110 VARA, however, was
limited to the protection of a very tiny subset of copyright-protected works: namely,
the works of visual artists who produce single works or editions of works numbering
fewer than 200.111 VARA essentially protects only “fine artists.”112 Because of this, it
has negligible impact on the economic engines of the copyright industries—which
are, as stated above, the core concern of United States copyright law.
Outside the limited context of VARA works, it is difficult to spot references
to attribution in the copyright statute. The only other clearly attribution-related
provisions in copyright law can be found as part of the 1998 Digital Millenium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”).113 The DMCA protects attribution interests (in a fashion)
by outlawing the alteration and removal of “copyright management information”
(“CMI”) that is conveyed in connection with a work.114 However, the potential
attribution rights found in the CMI provisions of the DMCA have been underused,
difficult to employ, and have presented interpretive challenges.

108 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, ___ (2003) (Scalia, J.) (noting
that the copyright act, in this portion, speaks to rights of attribution specifically).
109 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (mandating rights of attribution). It
took the United States over a century to sign the treaty. See Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost our Moral
Rights, and the Door Closed on Non-Economic Value in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INT. PROP. L. 1
(2005) (discussing the history of the Berne Convention).
110 Id. at 6bis.
111 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing special
protections for such works).
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
113 Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 11 (2001).
114 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
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The CMI provisions in the DMCA were enacted pursuant to obligations
under two 1998 World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties.
However, versions of the United States CMI provisions (and other key provisions of
the DMCA) were actually first drafted in the United States in 1995 under the
direction of President Clinton.115 The purpose of these provisions was to
prospectively re-tool copyright for the anticipated online economy. According to the
Copyright Office Report on the DMCA, both the anti-circumvention provisions
under 17 U.S.C §1201 and the CMI statutes in 17 U.S.C. §1202 “serve as
technological adjuncts to the exclusive rights granted by copyright law.”116 While the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA have received considerable (and largely
negative) attention, courts and commentators have noted that there has been a
relative “dearth of caselaw” on the CMI provisions.117 This is no longer true—there
are actually now several reported district court cases interpreting the CMI
provisions.118 But the early returns suggest that the CMI provisions have not been
particularly efficacious or well-drafted.119
According to the Senate Report on the CMI provisions, they are intended to
assist in the “licensing of rights and indication of attribution, creation, and
ownership.”120 Any attempt to quickly summarize the CMI provisions is doomed to
be imprecise, but they generally prohibit the knowing distribution of false copyright
management information that enables copyright infringement, as well as the

See IQ Group v. Wiesner Publishing, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593-94 (D.N.J. 2006) (describing
the history of the language in the CMI provisions).
116 [Copyright Office Report on DMCA.]
117 Schiffer Publ. Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 73 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1090 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 12,
2004); Gordon v. Nextel Communs., 345 F.3d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting “the very few
reported cases”).
118 See, e.g., Schiffer Publ. Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 73 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1090 (E.D.Pa.
Nov. 12, 2004); Gordon v. Nextel Communs., 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Med. Broadcasting Co.
v. Flaiz, Civ. No. 02-8554, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 (E.D. Pa. November 25, 2003); Learn2.com
v. Bell, Civ. No. 3:00-CV-812-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14283 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2000); IQ Group
v. Wiesner Publishing, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593-94 (D.N.J. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) aff’d in part, rev’d in part Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934
(9th Cir. 2002); Ward v. National Geographic Soc’y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Thron v. HarperCollins Publ., 64 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1221 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002).
119 Only a handful of plaintiffs have successfully invoked the CMI provisions. See, e.g., Med.
Broadcasting Co. v. Flaiz, Civ. No. 02-8554, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 (E.D. Pa. November 25,
2003) (suit against a former employee for unauthorized appropriation of computer files); Learn2.com
v. Bell, Civ. No. 3:00-CV-812-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14283 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2000) (suit against
a former employee for unauthorized appropriation of computer files).
120 S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998).
115
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intentional removal and alternation of CMI with knowledge that this will facilitate
copyright infringement.121
There are significant outstanding questions about the scope of the CMI
provisions. For instance, courts have had differing opinions as to whether they are
specifically targeted at digital information or they should apply to non-digital works.
The legislative history of these changes to the language of the CMI provisions simply
clouds the issue.122 The language used in the WIPO treaties took the narrower
approach, requiring member states to implement the protection of “electronic rights
management information.” However, the CMI provisions enacted in the United
States do not use any “digital” or “electronic” modifier, but simply protect “copyright
management information.”

121

See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) & (b). The exact language (currently) is as follows:
(a) False copyright management information. No person shall knowingly and
with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement-(1) provide copyright management information that is false, or
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management information
that is false.
(b) Removal or alteration of copyright management information. No person
shall, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law-(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management information,
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management information
knowing that the copyright management information has been removed or
altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law, or
(3) distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform works, copies of
works, or phonorecords, knowing that copyright management information has
been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law,
knowing, or, with respect to civil remedies under section 1203 [17 USCS §
1203], having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate,
or conceal an infringement of any right under this title.

122 See Severine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright management information and Moral Rights, 25
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377 (2003). David Nimmer has written extensively about the DMCA and its
CMI provisions. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Aus Der Neuen Welt, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 195 (1998)
(explaining the adoption of the CMI provisions); David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 401, 418 (1999) (discussing the broad definition of CMI and
the problems it presents); David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the
DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 929 (2002) ((“In contrast to Section 1201, the
provision mandating respect for copyright management information changed little during the course
of congressional deliberations.”).
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CMI, by statutory definition, includes several types of information that could
be presented in digital or analog form, including: the title of the work; the names of
the work’s author, copyright owner, performer, writer, and/or director; the terms and
conditions regarding use; and “numbers,” “symbols,” or “links,” referring to terms of
use.123 Most courts have, at least in dicta, have interpreted the definition of CMI
broadly,124 incorporating analog forms of copyright within its scope. But at least one
district court has opined that CMI should be “limited to components of…
technological measures.”125
Another significant ambiguity concerning the definition of CMI provisions
has been whether information that is conveyed with the work, but not is not
proximate to the work, qualifies for protection. The well-known case of Kelly v.
Arriba Soft is often cited with regard to this issue. The Kelly case involved a claim
made by a photographer whose work was re-displayed by an image search engine
outside of the context of the plaintiff’s website. The district court noted that the
CMI was not present in the image files that were displayed, but was present as part of
the surrounding website. The court stated that the CMI provisions applied “only to
the removal of copyright management information on a plaintiff's product or original
work.”126
The district court in Kelly clearly regarded the information surrounding the
images on the original website as a form of CMI.127 However, subsequent district
courts have used the above-quoted language from Kelly to support the proposition
that CMI must be found somewhere spatially proximate to the work. For instance, in
the case of Schiffer Publishing v. Chronicle Books, the district court cited Kelly for the
proposition that to fall afoul of § 1202(b), “a defendant must remove copyright

17 U.S.C. § 1202 (c).
The statutory language cited in the prior footnote, as well as the legislative history, makes this
interpretation very defensible. See S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) (“CMI need not be in digital form”).
125 IQ Group v. Wiesner Publishing, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593-94 (D.N.J. 2006) (“[The CMI
provisions] should not be construed to cover copyright management performed by people, which is
covered by the Copyright Act, as it preceded the DMCA; it should be construed to protect copyright
management performed by the technological measures of automated systems.”; citing Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and The Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998)).
126 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) aff’d in part, rev’d in part
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
127 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) aff’d in part, rev’d in part
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“There is no dispute the Ditto crawler
removed Plaintiff’s images from the context of Plaintiff’s Web sites where their copyright
management information was located, and converted them to thumbnails in Defendant’s index.
There is also no dispute the Arriba Vista search engine allowed full-size images to be viewed without
their copyright management information.”).
123
124
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management information from the ‘body’ of, or area around, plaintiff's work itself.”
In Schiffer, the copyright-protected photographs were present in a book that did not
display any CMI on the same page as the pictures. Hence, the court concluded the
copyright information in other areas of the book was not properly viewed as CMI in
relation to the infringing pictures.128
With regard to the removal of CMI, plaintiffs often fail because these claims
are not independent of their economic rights.129 In order to prove liability under the
CMI provisions in 1202(b), a plaintiff must essentially prove a defendant was
expressly contemplating copyright infringement when removing or distributing the
information without the required CMI.130 This tightly binds the CMI removal
provisions to traditional economic rights and divorces them from any true concern
about authorial interests in proper attribution.
For instance, in a hypothetical situation where an author’s publisher wished to
remove, without permission, the author’s attribution, the author would lack a cause
of action against the publisher if this would not result in an infringement of
copyright.131 In most cases, it would not, because the author would have transferred
copyright or licensed the publisher to reproduce the work without specifically
requiring attribution. Additionally, even where infringement could be found to exist,
the burden of showing a culpable mental state on the part of the defendant is a heavy
burden for any plaintiff. Rights-owning plaintiffs in several cases have failed to
prevail on their CMI claims because they lacked admissible evidence of the requisite
mental states of the infringing defendants.132

128

2004).

Schiffer Publ. Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 73 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1090 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 12,

129 See Severine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright management information and Moral Rights, 25
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 397 (2003); Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the
United States?, 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 9, 13 (2001).
130 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b).
131 Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 13 (2001) (“S] ince it is not copyright infringement even willfully to miscredit the
author, there would be no violation of section 1202 unless it could be shown that miscrediting
authorship induces infringement.”).
132 Schiffer Publ. Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 73 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1090 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 12,
2004) (“[B]ecause Defendants did not believe Plaintiffs had a copyright in their individual
photographs, they could not have committed knowing misconduct as required by the DMCA.”);
Gordon v. Nextel Communs., 345 F.3d 922, 923, 927 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Gordon failed to introduce
sufficient evidence that the copyright notice was removed with the requisite intent; we therefore
affirm the summary judgment with respect to Gordon’s § 1202 claims.”); Ward v. National
Geographic Soc’y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that the “facts are too murky”
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Of course, authors seeking significant attribution rights from publishers and
users of their works are free to exchange their proprietary rights in order to obtaining
affirmative attribution protections. In exchange for surrendering all or part of their
proprietary rights, authors are free to demand attribution in return by standard
contractual mechanisms. Yet as discussed in this section, in the absence of such
private ordering, copyright provides few or no mechanisms for asserting a right to
attribution.
Even where authors attempt to rely on contractual forms of private ordering
to resolve the conflicts and social harms that flow from the misattribution of
authorship, the fact is that, in the aggregate and from the perspective of the interests
of a larger society, this does not work effectively.133 An unregulated market in sales
of property that relies on private parties to protect attribution rights in a collateral
manner leads to a particular type of market failure. Trademark law is based upon that
proposition.

C. Trademark: Attribution Rights after Dastar
If we were to have full faith in property and contract, we might just let
producers of tangible products in the market place “fix” the absence of legal
trademark rights through contract. Producers might demand the recognition of
attribution rights from those who purchase their goods, using contractual
mechanisms to secure the integrity of their business reputations. However, the law
provides businesses with a more efficient solution via trademark protections.
Trademark law allows the providers of good and services the right to secure accurate
attribution and to prevent misattribution. It also serves the public by creating private
causes of action to prevent deceptive and misleading speech.
There is a fairly clean fit, at least from a theoretical perspective, between
authorial attribution rights and the law of trademark.134 Many cases, prior to 2003,
recognized the ability of authors to bring suits where their attributions of authorship

and that “[defendants] cannot be deemed to have known that plaintiff owned [the copyrights] for the
simple reason that the evidence is not clear cut.”); Thron v. HarperCollins Publ., 64 U.S.P.Q.2D
(BNA) 1221 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002) (“plaintiff has offered no competent, admissible evidence to
support any finding that defendants removed or altered [CMI] ‘intentionally,’ as required by the
statute”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“Defendant did not
have ‘reasonable grounds to know’ it would cause its users to infringe Plaintiff’s copyrights.”)
133
Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171, 1221-1228
(discussing the various ways that misattribution can thrive in the publishing industry).
134
Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171, 1194-2000
(2005).
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were removed or their works were misattributed.135 However, the United State
Supreme Court, in the 2003 case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
held that trademark law did not extend to the protection of authorial attributions,
overturning a long history of lower court doctrine.136
At issue in Dastar was an expired copyright for a television version of General
and President Dwight Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe.137
Fox held the
copyright and brought suit against a small company, Dastar. Dastar had obtained
original copies of the video, stripped out the original indications of authorship and
references to the book, and then re-released the films as with a new credit sequence,
which was limited to the names of the Dastar editors.138 While Fox prevailed on its
claims of misattribution at the district court level and on Dastar’s initial appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, it lost before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, essentially
eviscerated trademark-based protections for authorial attribution. Scalia drew a
bright, broad line between the laws of copyright and trademark. According to the
Dastar opinion, trademark law was never intended to reach authorial attribution,
because authors could not be understood as “origins” of goods:
[A]s used in the Lanham Act, the phrase “origin of goods” is in our
view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such an
extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of
accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and
inconsistent with precedent.139

See id.; Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding Lanham Act cause of action
where the plaintiff actor’s name was omitted and his role attributed to another in film credits); Follett
v. New American Library, 497 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting plaintiffs’ motion because
“the Lanham Act was designed to prevent the presentation of an author’s work to the public in a
distorted form and to protect the public and artist from misrepresentations of the artist’s
contribution to a finished work”); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1976). See
generally Lauren Wise, King v. Innovation Books: An Analysis of Credit Attribution with Respect to the Lanham
Act, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147, 147 (1994) (stating that “[a]uthors may sue under [the Lanham
Act] when an erroneous credit is issued”).
136 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 30 (2003).
137 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE (1948).
138 Id.
139 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 30 (2003).
135
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While Dastar received a substantial amount of praise from some academic
commentators, it has received substantial criticism as well.140 Those who have
praised Dastar have argued it was correct because it prevented Fox from exerting
intellectual property rights relative to a work that had fallen into the public domain.141
(The scope of Dastar has not been limited, by subsequent courts, to public domain
works.142) Those who criticize the Dastar case argue that by removing trademark law
as a vehicle for addressing authorial attribution, the Supreme Court has essentially
licensed plagiarism.143
Following Dastar, several courts have felt a new need to place further distance
between copyright and trademark laws, keeping the regimes of intellectual property
neatly separated as Justice Scalia purported to do. If copyright and trademark come
near each other, the story seems to go, they will create a dangerous alchemy
producing some monstrous “mutant,” as David Nimmer and Justice Scalia have
described it.144 Judge Guido Calibresi, citing Dastar, has recently taken up the torch,

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41
Hous. L. Rev. 263 (2004); Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger
Protection of Attribution Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273 (2005); Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Author's Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of Paternity?, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (2005); Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost our Moral Rights, and the Door
Closed on Non-Economic Value in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INT. PROP. L. 1 (2005) (discussing the
history of the Berne Convention); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship,
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005).
141 See, e.g., Jessica Bohrer, Strengthening the Distinction Between Copyright and Trademark: The Supreme
Court Takes a Stand, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23, 27-28 (“The Court . . . was rightfully concerned
that allowing the line to blur in a case such as this would create a state of ‘perpetual copyright
protection’ that could nullify the intent and effect of copyright and trademark law.”); Lynn McLain,
Thoughts On Dastar From a Copyright Perspective: A Welcome Step Toward Respite for the Public Domain, 11 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 91 (2003) (“It is to be hoped that the Court will continue the work that it
has begun. The public domain’s borders . . . must not be permitted to be truncated by other bodies
of law . . . .”); Richard Ronald, Note, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 243 (2004) (“[T]he Dastar Court frees manufactures [sic] to use public domain works
without fear of a burdensome attribution requirement.”).
142 Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171, 1214 & n.
168 (2005).
143 See, e.g. Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of
Attribution Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 298 (2005) (“Copying a work
without giving attribution is plagiarism, and the Court… is giving its blessings to the practice.”).
144 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (speaking of a “mutant copyright law”); David Nimmer, The Moral
Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 60 (2004) (claiming credit for coining the phrase).
140
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opining that “intellectual property owners should not be permitted to recategorize
one form of intellectual property as another.”145
This urge to establish some kind of legal “buffer zone” between the regimes
of trademark and copyright is extremely odd and dangerous. Obviously, courts
should not confuse copyright and trademark laws and their respective animating
theories with each other. When they blur the doctrines into a single type of property
right, this can create problems. Rights of publicity and what Justin Hughes has
recently termed “micro-works” are examples, I think, of the dangerous mutants that
can spring from the interstices of copyright and trademark.146 But if we have learned
anything from Hollywood’s X-Men trilogy, it is that not all mutants are evil—some
varieties of mutation are actually essential to legal evolution.147 Dastar’s attempt to
keep copyright and trademark separate is misguided, since the formal purity of
separateness that the Court seeks to maintain results in a decision that denies the
animating logic of both copyright and trademark.
This separatist logic has even found its way into cases involving the CMI
provisions of the DMCA. In the case of IQ Group v. Wiesner Publishing, the plaintiff
advertising company brought suit against a defendant advertising company that had
taken the plaintiff’s work, stripped out the plaintiff’s logo and hyperlink, and
continued to distribute the advertisements without the marks of authorship.148 The
court failed to find a violation of the DMCA’s CMI provisions, in part because the
logo was too clearly “a trademark.” It stated:
[A] logo in an email, to the extent that it operates as a trademark or
service mark, could communicate information that indicates the
source of the email… The problem is that this construction allows
a trademark to invoke DMCA protection of copyrights, eliminating
the differentiation of trademark from copyright that is fundamental
to the statutory schemes. If every removal or alteration of a logo
attached to a copy of a work gives rise a cause of action under the

See Chosun International, Inc.v. Chrisha Creations, 413 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir 2005) (Calabresi, J.)
(noting the principle that and citing Dastar).
146 See Justin Hughes, Size Matters: Or Should in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 585-86
(2005); Stacey Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006).
147 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale
University Press 1921).
148 The IQ Group v. Wiesner Publishing, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D.N.J. 2006) (“[T]he
differentiation of trademark from copyright… is fundamental to the statutory schemes.”).
145
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DMCA, the DMCA becomes an extension of, and overlaps with,
trademark law.
The court rejected the CMI-based claims, citing to Dastar for support.149
Thus, after reviewing the status of trademark and copyright, we are left with a
dilemma: Copyright law generally fails to provide any significant protections for
authorial attribution, forcing copyright proprietors to rely on their legal entitlements
to control reproduction, dissemination, and other exclusive rights in order to secure
the protection of authorial attribution.150 And, as discussed in this section, the law
understands that leaving the matter of attribution and reputation protections to
simple private ordering does not work. Trademark law, after Dastar, is legally
hobbled from providing a remedy for misattribution. Additionally, Dastar seems to
foster, among lower courts, open antagonism toward arguments that authorial
attribution and reputation protection has any place in either body of law.
Yet Ralph Shaw’s arguments for a right to credit are, if anything, more
compelling today than they were half a century ago. Giving legal valence to authorial
attribution would legally acknowledge the fundamentally different dynamics of open
copyright practices and promote the smooth functioning of reputation economies.
In the next section, I discuss two indications that, despite the current status of
intellectual property law, an increased role for attribution in copyright may be on the
way.

D. Two Signs of an Attribution Shift
i)

The Experience of Creative Commons

The Creative Commons project was founded in 2001 and is chaired by
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford Law School.151 As Niva Elkin-Koren

Id.
Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171, 1217-18
(2005) (discussing the mismatch between copyright’s proprietary incentives and private forms of
ordering and the legal interest in regulating misattribution); Rick Mortensen, D.I.Y. After Dastar:
Protecting Creators' Moral Rights Through Creative Lawyering, Individual Contracts and Collectively Bargained
Agreements, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335 (2006) (proposing ways that authors can attempt to
protect their attribution interests subsequent to Dastar).
151
See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 388 (2005) (suggesting the principles of Creative
Commons flow from Lessig’s publications).
149
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suggests, it is probably best understood as a social movement.152 Its Board of
Directors includes several other prominent law professors who write in the area of
intellectual property and copyright.153 The most prominent mission of Creative
Commons has been the promotion of a set of licenses designed to enable creators to
selectively reserve some rights.154
In its online mission statement, Creative Commons makes clear that it sees its
work as analogous to the work of the free software and open-source movements with
regard to software. It states “our ends are cooperative and community-minded” and
that it helps people “dedicate their creative works to the public domain—or retain
their copyright while licensing them as free for certain uses, on certain conditions.”155
Like the Free Software movement that it invokes in its mission statement, Creative
Commons is typically associated with the “copyleft” principles of resistance to
intellectual property law. Yet, also like the Free Software Movement, Creative
Commons does not simply add to the public domain—it uses the licensing of
copyright entitlements as a tool to advance its goals.
When Creative Commons released its first group of licenses in 2002, it offered
a menu of eleven license choices that mixed and matched four different requirements
made of those wishing to make use of the licensed works: a requirement that
authorial attribution should be provided (“by”), a requirement that use of the work
should be non-commercial (“nc”), a requirement that no derivative works should be

Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 388 (2005).
153
Professors James Boyle, Michael Carroll, and Molly Shaffer Van Houweling are also on the
board of Creative Commons.
154
As I indicated in an article prior to the establishment of the Creative Commons, I believe the
development of such simple licensing options for content creators is a very good idea, though I
believe metadata solutions might be preferable and more effective in a digital environment. See F.
Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293,
323 & fn. 108 (2001):
[O]ptions could permit “copyleft” advocates to check a box when creating a
file, to specify in the code, that the content of that file could be freely
distributed or integrated into new works… If feasible, two or three copyleft
options would be desirable, given the variety of options that have developed in
the area of free software. For instance, while one musician might wish to permit
her digital files to be freely copied, altered, or even integrated into other songs
without attribution, another might wish to allow his work to be freely copied as
long as the work was not altered and proper attribution was given at the time
the work was played.
152

Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2005).
155
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created utilizing the original work (“nd”), and a “viral” requirement that any derivate
works created should be licensed under terms identical to the original license
(“sa”).156 The original Creative Commons (“CC”) licenses allowed individuals to pick
and choose combinations of these options. Given this “menu” approach, Creative
Common can be aptly described as incorporating a certain degree of “ideological
fuzziness” into its core mission from the outset.157
In June of 2006, Creative Commons Chief Technology Officer Mike
Linksvayer estimated that over 140 million web pages had included CC licenses.158 If
this is accurate,159 it is a tremendous figure—though it pales beside the size of the
open copyright realm generally. Comparing Creative Common’s estimate of 140
licensed web pages with the estimate cited above that there are 10 billion web pages
currently in existence, this means that approximately 0.14% (over 1 in 1000) Web
pages link to a CC license of some form.160 Creative Commons licenses are also used
in relation to content that is not hosted on individual web pages. For instance, over
14 million digital photographs on the Web-based photo-sharing site Flickr are
reportedly licensed under Creative Commons licenses.161
A cynic might argue that simply pasting a Creative Commons logo on a blog,
Web page, or a public Flickr photo is a somewhat redundant—perhaps it is even an
act that might be seen as an assertion of ownership rights rather than sharing.162 By
definition, the average Web page or publicly posted digital photo on Flickr is shared
with the public in the same way that all open copyright content is shared. The
Creative Commons licenses operate, in part, as demands upon the public. They
assert the owner prohibits derivative works (“nd”) or prohibits commercial
exploitation of the content (“nc”). There is nothing legally wrong with this, of
course—these are both rights are inherent in the copyright entitlement. As Niva
Elkin-Koren suggests, however, there is a possibility that by making claims of
copyright ownership explicit, creative commons may be reifying norms of authorial

See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377, 388-89 (2005).
158 http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5937
159
Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 401n. 85 (2005) (noting that the data about the numbers
is somewhat unclear and suggesting it might be an overestimate).
160 By analogy, if the document present on the Web were analogized to a population the size of
the United States, a population the size of Omaha, Nebraska would be linking to CC licenses.
161 http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5936
162 Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378, 390 (2005)
156
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ownership that did not characterize the early Web.163 The CC licenses are effective in
the mission of increasing the sharing of content, however, insofar as they enable
those who access the content to repurpose it: all CC licenses make some forms of
“non-commercial” uses of licensed works legal, and thus they all encourage noncommercial distribution of the author’s creative content. Thus, in some ways, the
intent of creative commons is not exactly to encourage public access to works, but to
encourage derivative “viral” repurposing of works.
From the standpoint of attribution and law, Creative Commons is remarkable,
if perhaps accidentally so. Though it did not strongly encourage the adoption of any
particular type of license from its menu, Creative Commons has reported that over
97% of websites that use Creative Commons Licenses (over 13 million websites) have
chosen some variety of license that requires attribution. In 2004, responding to this,
Creative Commons removed the attribution “option” from its new licenses and made
attribution a default part of it licenses menu. There are now six possible CC
“Version 2.5” licenses. All six require authorial attribution.
The formal announcement that accompanied this change indicated that it was
not motivated by any particular ideological commitment to attribution, but was
simply a pragmatic decision motivated by popular demand:
Our web stats indicate that 97-98% of you choose Attribution, so
we decided to drop Attribution as a choice from our license menu - it's now standard. This reduces the number of licenses from
eleven possible to six and makes the license selection user interface
that much simpler.
For those that believe Dastar was a boon for the public domain, making
attribution a default requirement may seem inconsistent with the mission of an
organization devoted to the “commons.” A handful of commenters on the Creative
Commons mailing list made this exact charge, arguing that Creative Commons was
no longer enabling “free” content.164 A summary of the licenses by advisers at the
Debian project (an open source operating system) was highly critical of an early

Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 400 (2005).
164
See, e.g., Comment of Rob Meyer, at http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/cc-licenses/2004August/001059.html (“The work isn’t “Free,” you’re paying for it with attribution.”); Comment of
“Toddd”, at http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/cc-licenses/2004-August/001075.html (“Currently,
there is not a single free CC 2.0 license. They are ALL non-free. The current CC is a smack in the
face of the free software movement...”).
163
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version of the new CC licenses, suggesting they were incompatible with the principles
of free software.165
Even Creative Commons did not seem overly enthusiastic about the
modification, suggesting in its own announcement of the new licenses that “If we see
a huge uprising against the attribution-as-stock-feature, we'll certainly consider
bringing it back as an option.”166 In all likelihood, when it came up with its original
“menu,” Creative Commons did not intend to act as a vehicle for popularizing
attribution rights. Yet its experience has shown the popularity of authorial attribution
rights among open copyright creators. At least in one substantial corner of the online
content universe, information as commodity protections are being discarded in favor of
reputation protections.

ii) The Copyright Office’s Orphan Works Proposal
A second example of a shift toward attribution protections in copyright law
can be found in the Copyright Office’s proposed legislation on “orphan works.”
“Orphan works” are works that are still protected by copyright but where the
copyright holders are difficult or impossible to find. The concern with regard to
orphan works is that, in the absence of any means to obtain a license from the
copyright proprietor, the work is neglected and underused. Thus, the fear of liability
for copyright infringement becomes an insurmountable transaction cost preventing
the work from being repurposed in any way.
Following the Supreme Court’s landmark pro-copyright decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,167 and reportedly “at the urging of prominent legal scholars, academic-library
organizations, technology companies such as Google and Microsoft,”168 Congress
began to consider the issue of orphan works. In January of 2005, Senators Orrin
Hatch and Patrick Leahy wrote to the Copyright Office, urging it on behalf of
Congress to study and propose a solution to the problem of “orphan works.” House
Intellectual Property Subcommittee Chairman Lamar Smith and Ranking Member
Rick Berman also wrote to express their support for the effort.169

http://people.debian.org/~evan/ccsummary.html
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
167
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
168
Scott Carlson, Whose Work Is It, Anyway?, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, July
29, 2005.
169
The letters are reprinted in the Copyright Office’s full report. U.S. Copyright Office, Report
on Orphan Works (2006) [hereinafter “Report on Orphan Works’], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
165
166
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On January 26, 2005, The Copyright Office issued a Federal Register Notice
summarizing the issues raised by orphan works and soliciting written comments from
all interested parties. The request for comments asked the public what type of
solution would be most effective to deal with the problem. The Copyright Office
received over 850 written comments, from brief email messages to extensive legal
briefs.170 The Copyright Office also hosted public roundtable discussions on orphan
works in Washington, D.C. and in Berkeley, California. At the end of this process,
on January 31, 2006, the Copyright Office submitted its Report to Congress. The
Report contained a proposal to amend 17 U.S.C. § 514 of the copyright law to limit
available remedies.
From the standpoint of authorial attribution rights, the most interesting thing
about the Copyright Office’s proposed statutory amendment is that it explicitly
incorporates a requirement of attribution in order to take advantage of the limited
remedy provisions:
(a) Notwithstanding sections 502 through 505, where the infringer:
(1) prior to the commencement of the infringement, performed a
good faith, reasonably diligent search to locate the owner of the
infringed copyright and the infringer did not locate that owner, and
(2) throughout the course of the infringement, provided attribution
to the author and copyright owner of the work, if possible and as
appropriate under the circumstances, the remedies for the
infringement shall be limited as set forth in subsection (b).
This attribution requirement, with slight revisions, was adopted in the version of the
bill introduced by Congressman Lamar Smith before the House of Representatives.
The introduced legislation provided limited remedies in the event that:171
…the infringing use of the work provided attribution, in a manner
reasonable under the circumstances, to the author and owner of the
copyright, if known with a reasonable degree of certainty based on
information obtained in performing the reasonably diligent search.
Since neither copyright law nor trademark law speak to attribution, it may
seem strange that the Copyright Office gave attribution a prominent role in Section
514. According to the Copyright Office, the attribution requirement was not the
result of any strong outside campaign—“only a handful of commenters proposed a

Report on Orphan Works at 1.
Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (May 22, 2006), available at
http://www.gag.org/activities/advocacy_materials/HR_Orphan_Works_Act_2006.pdf.
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requirement along these lines.”172 Nonetheless, echoing Ralph Shaw, the Copyright
Office “found several good reasons to support this requirement… including the
notion that attribution is critically important to authors, even those who consent to
free use of their works.”173
The link to the experience of Creative Commons was made explicit when the
attribution requirements were being discussed:
[A]ttribution is a critically important aspect of copyright for authors
and owners, particularly individual authors. From our discussions
with various stakeholders, in the situation where an author is found
after a search prior to use, many times the author consents to a
royalty-free use, provided that the user provides proper attribution.
Indeed, the Creative Commons has published information that for
those authors who adopt one of the many forms of Creative
Commons licenses, about 94% of them opt for a license that
requires attribution. Thus, even among a group of creators that are
willing to permit wide dissemination and re-use of their works,
attribution is an essential and important part of preserving the
author’s interests in the work.174
The comments of the Copyright Office draw the right lesson from the
experience of Creative Commons. They point out the way in which open copyright
economies, in the so-called Digital Millennium, are increasingly relying upon the
dynamics of reputation and attribution as incentives for creation. These are
incentives that intellectual property law is, at the present moment ill-tuned to protect.
Hopefully, the Orphans Work draft legislation and the comments on attribution by
the Copyright Office offer a sign that this might change in the future.

III. A Modest Proposal for Modifying Fair Use
I have argued up to this point that attribution should play a larger role in
copyright law, given the importance of reputation-based incentives to open copyright
incentives and markets. In this last part, I would like to very briefly suggest one
modest proposal that would formally recognize the importance of attribution in the
doctrine of copyright law. Namely, I propose that the “fair use” provisions in 17

Report on Orphan Works at 110-11.
Id.
174 Id. The report listed additional reasons that attribution seemed like a good idea, e.g. 1)
attribution would facilitate market transactions, 2) attribution would avoid improper claiming of
credit by the putative infringer, and 3) attribution would be a non-burdensome requirement. Id.
172
173
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U.S.C. § 107 should be amended to include a fifth factor: the provision of attribution.
This proposal is simply one very small step in the direction of adapting copyright law
to the reputation economy. Reforming copyright law to respect the importance of
authorial credit should not end with such a small adjustment, but it might start with a
series of piecemeal modifications such as this.
“Fair use” is the defensive mechanism in copyright law by which an alleged
infringer can escape liability for copyright infringement. It originated in the United
States as a judicial doctrine, but became fixed by statute in the Copyright Act of
1976.175 Currently, the four well-known statutory factors that must be included in
any determination of fair use are as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
My proposal is to add an additional fifth fair use factor, modeled on the
language used in the proposed Orphan Work legislation:
(5) the provision of attribution, in a manner reasonable under the
circumstances, to the author of the work
This amendment is advisable because the existing fair use factors fail to take
into account the importance of credit and attribution. To the contrary, the first and
fourth factors,176 clearly have an approach toward copyright that prioritizes the
centrality of commercial markets and the marginality of the “non-commercial”
sector.177 According to the first and fourth factors, if a use participates in or

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
I do not have much to say about the second and third fair use factors. The second factor, by
prioritizing the creative works that are seen as at the core of copyright’s concern, essentially gives a
more nuanced voice to the idea/expression dichotomy. The third fair use factor is also essentially a
statement about copyright law’s logic: it points to the fact that slight “borrowing” is more permissible
than wholesale appropriation. While these factors can be criticized, they seem largely neutral with
respect to open copyright.
177 R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
175
176
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interferes with existing pecuniary markets, it is presumed unfair. If a use occurs
outside existing pecuniary markets, it is presumed fair.
Open copyright practices, however, operate outside pecuniary markets and
place high value on practices of attribution. When fair use law is applied to open
copyright practices, it would be decidedly unfair not to take into account the manner
in which attribution has been provided to an author. Reputation is, after all, the
primary market value that the open copyright author is seeking to maximize. Adding
a requirement that courts should consider attribution when weighing the factors of
fair use would not bind courts in any significant way. Fair use is a notoriously fuzzy
test, which in the eyes of some, is impossible to damage further.178 It would lead
them to consider the relevance of attribution in the particular circumstances.179
Before the creation of the four factors in the 1976 Act, cases can be found
that explicitly taken into account the interplay of attribution and fair use. For
instance, in the 1941 case of Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co.,180 a district court stated that the
reprinting of partial song lyrics by the Saturday Evening Post with authorial attribution
served only to add to the reputation capital of the copyright owner. In light of all the
circumstances, the court found that the use was fair:
It will be noted that the author of the article in question
acknowledged the authorship of the song, and in fact paid a tribute
to him. No question of the originality of the song is here
involved… Undoubtedly many thousands who read the article
became aware for the first time of the existence of a musical
composer by the name of Eric Karll.181
Though today’s four factors do not include attribution, this does not mean
that attribution has not worked its way into fair use cases. While some secondary
sources downplay the relevance of attribution,182 there are a substantial number of
423, 425 (2005).
178 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 114-16 (2004); R. Polk Wagner, The
Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 426-27 (2005).
179 See Patrick Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1134-35 (1992) (“Though the criteria suggested by the Copyright Act are
not intended to be exclusive, the absence of moral rights as an enumerated consideration could lead
courts to overlook these important interests… By specifically mentioning attribution and integrity,
Congress will focus the courts' attention to this matter without materially altering the fair use
doctrine.”).
180 39 F. Supp. 836, 838-39 (E.D. Wis. 1941)
181 Id.
182 See Kenneth Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural Progress?, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 131 n.87 (1998) (“[P]ublishers generally have insisted that
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cases that support the relevance of attribution to fair use. These cases usually manage
to fit the question of attribution into the first factor.183 The Nimmer treatise notes
very briefly that the “propriety” of a defendant’s conduct is relevant to the “purpose
and character of the use” and that under the rubric of equitable considerations, the
provision of attribution can contribute to a finding of fair use.184
Several cases explicitly address fair use and attribution. One of the first post1976 Act cases to address the issue was Marcus v. Rowley,185 decided in the Ninth
Circuit. The plaintiff was a home economics teacher who brought suit against
another home economics teacher for the unauthorized copying and sale of portions
of a book on cake decorating. In considering the first factor, the court noted that
“there was no attempt by defendant to secure plaintiff's permission to copy the
contents of her booklet or to credit plaintiff for the use of her material… Rowley's
conduct in this respect weighs against a finding of fair use.”186

educators and librarians include formal notices on any "fair use" copies, even though nothing in the
"fair use" law requires attribution.”); Otto Konrad, A Federal Recognition of Performance Art Author Moral
Rights, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579, 1627-1628 (1991) (stating that fair use allows use of a work
without attribution.). The Nimmer treatise sends somewhat mixed messages about the relevance of
attribution. See Nimmer on Copyright]. § 13.05 (noting that while attribution is not an excuse for
infringement, the failure of a copyist to credit an author can cut against a finding of fair use
“Moreover, the fact that a copier acknowledges the source of the copied material does not make a
fair use of what is otherwise a substantial taking.”).
The pre-1976 Act case of Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & M. Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa.
1938), is sometimes cited for the indifference of fair use doctrine to attribution practices. See id. at
304 (“The fact that the defendant acknowledged the source from which this matter was taken does
excuse the infringement. While the acknowledgment indicates that it did not intend unfair.”)
183 Professor Rebecca Tushnet has suggested that in the case of fan fiction, attribution “bears an
indirect relation to the fourth fair use factor” because, by minimizing confusion as to source, it
“preserves the market for the original product.” Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction,
and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 680 (1997).
184 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 8B.03[C][1] (1997)
[hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]. § 13.05 [1][d] (“At least one additional factor relevant to the
‘character’ of the use is the propriety of the defendant’s conduct. Characterizing the fair use doctrine
as ‘‘equitable,’ it has been held that defendant’s unjustified denial of its use of the plaintiff’s work is a
factor militating against permitting defendant to claim a fair use defense. Correlatively, attributing a
usage of plaintiff’s work to plaintiff can increase the fairness of defendant’s utilization.”)
Often cited with regard to the lack of relevance of attribution is the case of Henry Holt & Co. v.
Liggett & M. Tobacco Co. In that case, the court found that a cigarette manufacturer's quotation
from a scientific research and proper authorial attribution was relevant to unfair competition claims,
but was not relevant to its copyright infringement analysis
185 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983).
186 Id.
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Three years later, the Second Circuit took up the relation of attribution and
fair use in the case of Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell.187 The defendant had printed
quotations (consisting of over 7,000 words, or about 4% of the book) and provided
attribution to Matone-Graham. Though the opinion of the court did not focus
specifically on attribution in the fair use analysis, it did note that the defendant had
credited the plaintiff as the source of the quotes and had not sought to displace the
market for the original work. The court ultimately concluded that the use in question
was fair.
In the case of Weissman v. Freeman,188 the Second Circuit addressed the issue of
attribution and fair use more squarely. Judge Richard J. Cardamone, focusing on the
equities of the case before proceeding to the statutory factors, found that a failure to
attribute authorship worked against the defendant’s claim of fair use. At issue, as the
court described it, was “the paradigm of the problems that arise when a long
relationship between accomplished professor and brilliant assistant comes to an
end…In this case… Dr. Freeman not only neglected to credit appellant for her
authorship of P-1, but actually attempted to pass off the work as his own, substituting
his name as author in place of hers.” 189 According to Judge Cardamone, “Dr.
Freeman's conduct severely undermines his right to claim the equitable defense of
fair use. No case was cited—and we found none—that sustained such defense under
circumstances where copying involved total deletion of the original author's name
and substitution of the copier's.”
Judge Cardamone once again discussed attribution and fair use in the wellknown case of Rogers v. Koons,190 In his analysis of the first fair use factor, that the
“Puppies” statute of Jeff Koons was not a transformative work of parody because
Koons had not made the public aware of the original work:
The rule's function is to insure that credit is given where credit is
due. By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody,
we merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the
parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable to a
different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that the

803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986). The plaintiff was Katrina Maxtone-Graham, who had published
a book Pregnant by Mistake, that contained interviews with a number of women who had experienced
unwanted pregnancies. The defendant was James Burtchaell, a Catholic priest and a professor of
theology at Notre Dame. Burtchaell had sought permission to use quotations from the interviews in
his book, Rachel Weeping, but Maxtone-Graham had denied permission.
188 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989).
189 Id.
190 960 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir.1992).
187
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copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some
manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the
parody.191
As in the Weissman case, Judge Cardamone’s understandings about the importance of
proper credit were clearly playing a significant role in the ruling against the defendant.
Two recent district court cases in the Second Circuit have also incorporated
the issue of attribution into discussions of fair use. In Williamson v. Pearson Educ.,
Inc.,192 the court favored a finding of fair use under the first factor where the
defendant had included the plaintiff’s book as “Recommended Reading” and given
credit to the plaintiff as a source of the borrowed material.193 In Richard Feiner & Co.
v. H.R. Industries.,194 the court found that a failure to attribute was relevant to the
fourth fair use factor.195
What these cases demonstrate is not that attribution is regularly considered by
courts as a factor in the fair use analysis. This is most certainly not the case. The
cases merely illustrate that in certain cases, plaintiffs and defendants have been
successful in leading courts to incorporate evidence about attribution into a fair use
analysis. Despite the absence of any explicit attribution consideration in the factors,
some judges have seen fit to incorporate finding and consideration about attribution
in their opinions, finding it to be an equitable consideration guiding fair use analysis.
The task of reforming copyright law to take open copyright practices into
account will be a long and complicated struggle. My proposal here is just one
possible way to start this process. In light of the shift described in this paper toward
open copyright and reputation-based production markets, adding a fifth “attribution”
factor to the fair use factors would be a very small step in the right direction.

Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
193 Id.
194 10 F.Supp.2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, No. 98-9390, 1999 WL 385763
(2d Cir. 1999).
195 Id. (“Feiner also observes that by holding out the photograph to the world without attribution
to Feiner, HRI has impacted Feiner's market by creating the impression that the photograph is now
in the public domain. Given that HRI's use was directed at the film industry, the very market
available to Feiner for exploitation of its rights, I agree with Feiner.”)
191
192
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